Do active managers live up to their pitch? : an empirical study on Scandinavian active fund performance in crises by Brautaset, Camilla Helén & Torset, Wendel Andrine
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, Fall 2020
Do active managers live up to their
pitch?
An empirical study on Scandinavian active fund performance in crises
Camilla Helén Brautaset and Wendel Andrine Torset
Supervisor: Trond M. Døskeland
Master thesis, Economics and Business Administration
Major: Financial Economics
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are
responsible – through the approval of this thesis – for the theories and methods used, or




This thesis is written as part of our Master of Science in Economics and Business
Administration at NHH with emphasis in Financial Economics. The process of writing
this thesis has been challenging and rewarding, and it has been particularly interesting to
learn about a topic of our choice. Working together towards a goal has been a memorable
journey.
We want to use this opportunity to thank our supervisor, Trond M. Døskeland, who
provided feedback, good stories, and advice to keep us moving in the right direction. We
also want to recognize the PhD students André Wattø Sjuve and Andreas Ørpetveit for
valuable insight and data support. Last, but not least, we want to thank our families and
friends for their support throughout the process.
ii
Abstract
Active fund management is a heated topic. Investors have been willing to pay for skilled
active managers in the belief that they will obtain greater returns. The literature remains
skeptical. In their defence active managers counter that they outperform in times of
crisis such that their involvement has a “hedging” or “insurance effect”. Yet, existing
literature do not support active manager’s ability to deliver on their promise. This thesis
challenges the active manager pitch by observing the performance of actively managed
funds in Scandinavia in crisis relative to non-crisis. Debatable topics such as investment
focus, fees, active share, and persistence are assessed. The main conclusion suggests that
active managers fail to outperform across the Scandinavian market. Yet, the concept of
an “insurance premium” gains some support. In sum, these findings add to the pile of
literature on active fund underperformance, and thus managers failing to deliver on their
pitch.
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1 Introduction
A recently published Financial Times article described the active manager pitch as follows:
“While they might underperform in bull markets, they prove their mettle in times of
volatility” (Darbyshire, 2020). This thesis aims to figure out if this is really true by
comparing fund performance in crisis relative to non-crisis.
The literature on this topic is not convincing. A recent study evaluating active fund
performance during the Covid-19 pandemic suggests that the active manager pitch remains
unproven, even at a time stricken by record high volatility levels (Pastor & Vorsatz, 2020).
The crisis effectively resulted in the largest single-month drawdown observed in the past
20 years. In other words, if active managers do not prove their mettle amidst a severe
crisis affecting all corners of the world – how can the active manager’s pitch be tenable?
There are primarily three motivating factors for this thesis. The first is provoked by the
current world situation - 2020 has been a year of deep global crisis. In this light, we want
to observe how actively managed funds actually perform in a crisis context relative to
non-crisis. The second factor is shaped by the existing literature gap on fund performance
in Scandinavia, primarily due to the disproportionate focus on the US market. It is useful
to highlight the geographic scope of our study due to differences in regulations, market
structure and resource reliance. The third factor brings more reflection and attention to
the existing literature gap on the manager perspective. In contrast to existing literature
focusing on performance net of fees, we want to assess if managers add value before fees,
and in so doing introduce new perspectives and market insights. All three factors together
culminate into the question: Do Scandinavian active funds perform better in crisis relative
to in non-crisis?
To provide depth to our analysis, four additional factors are observed: investment
focus, fees, level of active management and persistence. First, studies suggest that
managers’ proximity to their investment choices matter, in particular due to the associated
informational advantage.1 Do domestically invested funds perform better in crisis? Second,
most traditional studies2 miss important nuances such as investors willingness to pay
1See e.g. Coval & Moskowitz (2001).
2See e.g. Jensen (1968); Carhart (1997).
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higher fees during economic downturn (Pastor & Vorsatz, 2020). The high fee is often
referred to as an "insurance" that hedges against negative return. Is it worth paying higher
fees in times of crisis? Third, the limited literature on the level of active management in
crisis suggests that funds with lower active share underperform and are more prevalent in
crisis.3 Do active funds perform better in crisis with higher levels of active management?
Lastly, increasingly efficient markets challenges active managers’ ability to outperform
over time. Do top performing funds persistently outperform even in times of crisis?
Ultimately, the main goal is to establish whether active managers can justify their role
despite the puzzling underperformance reported in existing literature.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In chapter 2 further background and
related literature is introduced, which in turn provides a basis for the research questions
presented in chapter 3. In chapter 4, the dataset and refined sample is introduced along
with the selected variables of interest. Thereafter, the empirical methodology is developed
in chapter 5 with the accompanying findings in chapter 6. Chapter 7 offers a discussion
based on the findings, which is further wrapped up with a conclusion in chapter 8, while
limitations and suggestions for further research are raised in chapter 9.
3See e.g. Petajisto (2013).
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2 Background and Related Literature
In this section we introduce the foundation of our thesis with reference to relevant
background and literature. First, we describe the mutual fund concept and the mutual
fund market, specifically focusing on Scandinavia. Further, we consider mutual fund
management and the value of active fund management in crises. Lastly, we introduce the
active manager perspective by examining investment focus, fees and active management
levels.
2.1 Mutual Funds
Mutual funds are pools of money from investors, designed to benefit from diversification
and economies of scale. The main categories of mutual funds are equity, fixed income, and
money market funds. In the pursuit of greater returns, investors choose mutual funds as an
attractive and convenient way to access financial markets and increase their wealth. There
are particularly three benefits mutual funds offer to investors: diversification, cost savings,
and sharing of liquidity risk among mutual fund investors (Chordia, 1996). According to
economist Harry Markowitz, diversification is the only "free lunch" that exists (Schwab,
2016). In result, due to the diversification of risk, mutual funds can still be a suitable
choice for investors during economic downturns.
2.2 The Scandinavian Mutual Fund Market
The mutual fund market in Scandinavia was first established in Denmark in 1956, followed
by Sweden in 1958 and finally Norway in 1982 (Järf, 2016). The Swedish fund market is
the largest market in the region with a large presence of international asset managers such
as JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs. In the first quarter of 2020, the Swedish equity fund
market was 213.1bn USD in total net assets, while Norway had 53.3bn USD and Denmark
51.2bn USD (Rodriguez, 2020). In comparison, the US equity market is significantly larger
with a total net asset value of 11,520bn USD (Rodriguez, 2020). It should therefore come
as no surprise that existing research is heavily focused on the latter geographic region.
The Scandinavian fund market is characterized by high transparency, effective consumer
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protection, and generally lower costs and greater attention toward sustainability than
in other EU countries (Nordström, n.d.). The Scandinavian countries’ high level of
education, low crime rate, well-developed infrastructure and public welfare system serve
as a competitive edge compared with other markets, especially by reason of their strong
institutions and financial stability.
Scandinavia offers a unique variety of quality companies within various sectors including
energy and seafood in Norway, commercial brands and export commodities in Sweden, and
biotech and health in Denmark (Fjell, 2019). Large companies within the Scandinavian
market include Equinor in oil and gas, Novo Nordisk in health care, and H&M in retail.
The innovative nature and the high sustainability scores of the Scandinavian market serve
as winning traits in the future equity market (Fjell, 2019).
Variations in market maturity, size, fund activity levels, fees, and flows differ substantially
across time and countries (Plantier, 2014). Apparently, larger fund markets and lower fees
tend to be linked to countries with high education and wealth (Khorana, Servaes & Tufano,
2005). Cremers, Ferreira, Matos & Starks (2016) find that actively managed funds have
higher active share and charge lower fees in markets experiencing competitive pressure
from passive funds. Keeping this insight in mind, we will consider fund management.
2.3 Mutual Fund Management
There are two main ways of managing a fund – active and passive management where
the latter aims to mimic a market-weighted index or portfolio. The modern passive
strategy emerged around 1970 and has since expanded quickly due to the growth of the
Exchange Trading Funds (ETF) market (Lettau & Madhavan, 2018). In contrast to
passive management, active management aims to outperform the market by deviating
from the benchmark’s portfolio holdings.
Despite a significant global shift from active to passive, active management is still a
significant segment of the market. In this thesis, we choose to depart from the trendy
passive versus active management discussion, and instead solely consider actively managed
equity funds. Investors everlasting hope of outperformance in the “next” bear market
can explain why the popularity of active management endures (Carlson, 2018). Yet,
the modern active management industry is no longer what it once was due to tougher
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competition and tighter margins (Wigglesworth, 2020). The implications of the constantly
changing asset management landscape will not be further discussed here, but question
whether active managers are able to create value will be explored.
2.4 Active Management
The following section will explain why active fund performance is worth investigating
during crises, starting off with references to the academic literature and traditional financial
theory.
The past 50 years of academic literature in this area was set in motion when Sharpe
introduced “the traditional view” of active management in 1966. In the aftermath, few
studies, if any, draw the conclusion that actively managed funds consistently outperform the
benchmark (Carhart, 1997; Jensen, 1968; Malkiel, 1995). These studies are predominantly
based on the mature and highly efficient US equity market.
US studies do not necessarily apply to the Scandinavian market. It is therefore necessary
to consider the few existing studies on Scandinavian actively managed funds. Christensen
(2013) found that only 7% of the 71 Danish mutual funds in his sample generated
significantly positive alphas in the period between 2000 and 2010. The results of Flam &
Vestman (2014) suggest that more than half of Swedish active funds outperformed between
1999 and 2009. Lastly, an extensive Norwegian study on fund performance between 1982
and 2008 did not find significant risk-adjusted abnormal returns (Sørensen, 2010).
The evolution of the fund market, in tandem with economic and financial development
shapes what is ultimately observed in the fund market (Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel & Ramos,
2013). Modern research documents that these variations affect the market efficiency and
active fund performance (Ito, Noda & Wada, 2014). Compared to the US market, both
emerging markets and some developed European markets (although to a lesser degree),
are considered to have a higher potential for continued misplacement. Given that the
Scandinavian market is known for having a robust, well-functioning banking system, the
level of inefficiency in this market is worth questioning. Dyck, Lins & Pomorski (2013)
found that fund outperformance is dependent on underlying market efficiency.
The traditional market efficiency hypothesis has been a dominant financial theory as it
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offers a theoretical basis for observations in the financial market (Fama, 1970). According
to the efficient market hypothesis, all available and relevant information will be reflected
in the price of securities. Hence it is no easy task for active managers to make money
trading securities and effectively “beat the market”.
However, Fama’s theory has later been challenged by behavioural finance and the adaptive
market hypothesis theories, as well as novel literature. Conditional performance models
have evaluated the expected fund performance over time dependent on the state of the
economy (Koswoski, 2011; Ferson & Qian, 2014). Von Reibnitz (2017) similarly finds
that fund performance is strongly correlated with the underlying market environment and
volatility levels.The resulting performance findings give more credit to managers´ ability
to create value and outperform during recessions. After all, Albert Einstein’s phrase
«amidst every crisis, lies great opportunity» might apply to the fund market as well. The
critical question is whether active managers are able to exploit the market inefficiencies
during crisis?
2.5 Active Management in Crises
Market crises can offer opportunities for active managers due to financial market
dislocations. These mispricings occur under stressful market conditions as the financial
markets are not able to correctly price assets on an absolute and relative basis (Pasquariello,
2014). Inefficiency in the market therefore serves as a necessary condition for active
managers to deliver alpha to investors (Waring & Siegel, 2003).
Research suggests that the value of active management depends on the state of the economy
and the investors´ marginal utility of consumption.4 From the investor perspective, periods
of recession tend to be accompanied with higher marginal utility due to lower consumption
and risk-taking. In this thesis, the bad state of the economy is represented by crisis
periods.5 Kosowski (2011) found that active managers add value by outperforming in
recessions. The findings of conditional performance models suggest that active managers
show better decision making and outperformance during recessions (Glode, 2011; De Souza
& Lynch, 2012; Moskowitz, 2000; Kosowski, 2011). These findings suggest a positive
4See e.g. Ferson & Schadt, 2016; Glode, 2011; Kosowski, 2011.
5This paper does not make a distinction between crisis, bad state of the economy and recession, and
likewise non-crisis, good state of the economy and expansion.
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correlation between active return6 and investors’ high marginal utility during recessions,
which indeed affects the value of active management. Studies that fail to consider investors
higher marginal utility tend to undervalue manager performance in recessions (Berk & van
Binsbergen, 2015; Kosowski, 2011). The above-mentioned results are predominantly based
on US actively managed equity funds. None of the previously mentioned Scandinavian
studies evaluate fund performance in the context of crisis.
Investor and manager investment decisions impacting fund performance during crisis will
now be considered. This will form the basis for the additional research questions on
investment focus, fees, and level of active management.
2.6 Investment Decisions in Crises
A cross-sectional study of the Swedish fund market found that features such as low fees, high
active share, and past outperformance can explain fund performance (Dahlquist, Engström
& Söderlind, 2000; Smørgrav & Næss, 2011). Due to the limited existing literature, there
is good reason to see how these features have unfolded in the Scandinavian market.
2.6.1 Geographical Investment Focus
An interesting note will illustrate the domestic versus international mandate trend.
Between 1994 and 2008, the share invested in equity mutual funds with a Norwegian
mandate decreased from 90% to less than 20%. This shift does not suggest a contraction of
the Norwegian fund market, but increasing investment in funds with international mandates
(Sørensen, 2010). This trend aside, do funds with domestic investment focus perform
better during crisis? Are there any competitive advantages of investing domestically
compared to internationally during crisis?
Coval & Moskowitz (2001) find that managers who invest a significant part of their assets
locally perform better. This suggests that managers´ proximity to their investment choices
do matter. The informational advantage obtained from investing nearby is not as available
to managers investing in more distant and less familiar markets. In other words, staying
close to the investment object allows active managers to take advantage of the available
6Active return is defined as the fund return resulting from the active portion of the portfolio.
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information to a greater extent, which can further lead to fund outperformance (Coval &
Moskowitz, 2001). So how does this play out in the Scandinavian market?
2.6.2 Fund Fees
The annual fund fee is calculated by dividing total fund expenses with the total fund assets
under management (Napoletano & Curry, 2020). The size of the premium necessary to get
access to the famous “hedge” during crisis is questioned in existing literature. A handful
of studies find that higher fees are associated with worse performance and therefore do
not support the existence of skilled or informed managers (Carhart, 1997; Malkiel 1995).
Glode (2011) finds that high fee funds display worse performance unadjusted for risk and
expected return. Yet, the same funds display better risk-adjusted return during recessions
suggesting a highly countercyclical behaviour. Glode (2011) suggests that this "insurance"
potentially explains the survival of poorly performing funds.
The question regarding the premium payment for active management is a heated topic
both for the investor and manager. Since correction of market mispricing helps facilitate
market efficiency, active managers investing in securities whose price deviates from
their fundamental value incorporate the “costly news into the prices” (Wermers, 2019).
So, despite the skepticism around high-cost active strategies, active management can
nonetheless collectively benefit all investors in the market, suggesting that both their time
and price can be justified (Sharpe, 1966). This finding suggests that active managers
can be worth positive fees in the aggregate, as they serve the important economic role of
efficiently allocating resources (Gârleanu & Pedersen, 2018).
No manager would use resources to gather information if it did not pay to trade on it
(Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). Kosowski (2011) suggests that investors more willingly
pay premiums for assets negatively correlated with consumption. Some mutual fund
investors may even be willing to trade off some overall performance in favour of superior
performance in bad states of the economy when the marginal utility of wealth is high
(Kosowski, 2011).
What is an active manager worth? Do investors pay high fees to gain access to skilled
managers or are they fooled? Although studies suggest that investors are willing to pay for
higher return during bear markets, studies also suggest that higher fees do not necessarily
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equal access to skilled managers net of fees (Jensen, 1968; Gruber, 1996; Wermers, 2000).
The cost of gaining access to skill often offsets or even more than offsets its value. When
fees are subtracted from return only 0.6% of fund managers show performance excess of
fees, however this does not necessarily mean that active managers do not have skill and
create value (Barras, Scaillet, & Wermers, 2010).
Based on the above, it is not clear if higher fee funds equal better insurance in crises.
Even though the Scandinavian market can be considered a front runner by reason of
its transparent and regulated market environment, a significant number of investors are
still not well-informed decision makers in the investment process (Linderud, Bakken,
Bøhmer & Vold, 2020). Gruber (1996) highlights in his paper that advertisers, brokers,
and institutions influence investors to choose active management.
Studies have found that the combination of high fees and lower active share (closet
indexers) substantially underperform relative to their benchmark (Cremers, 2017). This
raises the next criterion: the level of active management and fund performance in crisis.
2.6.3 Active Share
Active share measures the percentage of the portfolio that differs from the benchmark index
(Pestajisto, 2013). Active management is not a fixed strategy but rather a continuum. It
is therefore interesting to consider how the level of active management relates to fund
performance during crisis. Do active managers adjust their active management strategy
to outperform in crisis? If so, what level of active share outperforms in crisis?
Historically, high fees and low active share funds appear more often in times of high
volatility and economic uncertainty. For instance, closet indexing had a declining trend
when the market was in a stable recovery phase in 2003. In contrast, the onset of the
2006 subprime mortgage-crisis and market uncertainty was accompanied with a sudden
increase in closet indexing, more so-called “index hugging” and safer investment strategies
(European Securities Market Authority, 2020). The phenomenon also gained more ground
in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Petajisto, 2013). These findings suggest that fund
managers tend to pursue a lower active share strategy during crisis.
Cremers & Petajisto (2009) consider performance both before and after fees, and conclude
that low active share funds strongly underperform, whilst high active share funds
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persistently outperform. A study of 55 active Norwegian funds found evidence that
higher active share funds outperform lower active share funds, and that funds’ active share
proved to be higher in expansions and lower during recessions (Smørgrav & Næss, 2011).
The level of active management is not well studied in relation to fund performance in
crisis. The available literature suggests that lower active management underperforms and
is more prevalent during crises. Does this indicate that funds with lower active share
perform worse, or is the underperformance a direct result of the market crisis? Could
higher levels of active management make it easier to navigate in turbulent markets?
2.6.4 Persistence
According to Carhart (1997), persistence is well documented in the finance literature,
yet not well explained. Persistence is here defined as the existence of funds’ continued
or prolonged performance. The drives of persistence in our sample will not be assessed,
but the existence of performance persistence for winning and losing funds will be checked
in the observed period, by observing the performance both pre-crisis, during crisis, and
post-crisis. Do the same winners persist independent of the state of the economy?
Apparently, it is not common to observe persistence in the “modern” fund market due to
increasing efficiency in the equity market (Bernstein, 1998). Barras et al. (2010) found
in their study of funds from 1990 to 2006 that the proportion of skilled funds decreased
dramatically from 14.4% to 0.6%. This suggests that it is increasingly more challenging
for active managers to persistently outperform. According to an international study on
equity funds, Denmark and Norway were the only countries (out of 28) whose results
indicated that chasing past winners could produce abnormal return (gross alpha) (Ferreira,
Keswani, Miguel & Ramos, 2012).
2.7 The Three Crises
Even though no crisis will ever be the same, crises share some similarities. There are
particularly three elements that are similar in the event of a crisis: the triggering event,
the spread of the shock, and the wider impact (OECD, 2008).
The Financial Crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic both qualify as the largest global recessions
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since the Great Depression in the 1930´s, and both crises emerged out of two world leading
economies, namely the US and China (Fontevecchia, 2020). The S&P500 index was
considered overvalued prior to these crises, and stock valuations dropped with almost 75%
of their valuations when the crises propagated (Fontevecchia, 2020). In addition to these
global crises, we include the 2014 Oil Crisis, as this affected the Scandinavian market,
and particularly the Norwegian market. The three crises were chosen to highlight and
contrast fund performance in different crises.7
The Financial Crisis was primarily rooted in banking sector instability, the oil plunge
occurred in response to supply-demand imbalance, and the Covid-19 pandemic developed
from a deadly respiratory virus giving rise to deep macroeconomic and financial
repercussions. We expect that these differences will have different implications on the
financial markets and active fund performance.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the max drawdown of the sample funds, namely the drop from peak
to trough before another peak is reached. This is relevant in a crisis perspective since the
fund value is likely to fluctuate in response to market volatility. The max drawdown is
large during both the Financial Crisis and the Covid-19 Pandemic, and we suspect that
the deep global consequences of these crises explain these drops.
Figure 2.1: Max drawdown observed from 2007 to 2020
7See section 4.2 for definitions of the three crisis periods.
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2.7.1 The Financial Crisis
The Financial Crisis in 2008-2009 was defined as a Financial Crisis. The US housing
market bubble was the main catalyst of the extreme financial market stress that spread
across the world from mid 2007 to mid 2009 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2009). The
combination of high default rates on subprime mortgages along with deregulation in the
financial industry triggered various dysfunctional events in the banking system. As a
result, stock prices plunged, investors fled to lower risk assets, and volatility rose to high
levels. The official outbreak is often considered the Lehman Brother collapse on 15th of
September 2008. The bank collapse triggered a global panic with investors starting to
withdraw their money in fear that their banks would fail. As a result, liquidity evaporated
due to the drastic fall in investment and consumption, which brought the global economy
into deep recession (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2009).
2.7.2 The Oil Crisis
The Oil Crisis in 2014 is defined as a macroeconomic crisis, starting with an historical drop
in the oil price. In the Scandinavian region, the Norwegian oil industry was particularly
hurt, sending the sector into the worst crisis it had seen in many years (Aftenposten,
2020). The triggers behind the severe oil plunge were mainly supply-side issues, however
lower demand and growth prospects were also part of the equation. Upward surplus in
unconventional oil production, prospects for decreasing global demand of oil, shifting
OPEC policies, geopolitical risks and appreciation of the US dollar were all contributing
factors to the 70% drop in the oil price from mid 2014 to early 2016 (Stocker et al., 2018).
It is recognized as one of the largest declines and long-lasting collapses since World War
II (Stocker et al., 2018). In other words, the plunge was a product of both economic and
political factors. Figure 2.2 illustrates the oil price in the period from January 2007 to
June 2020. An oil price drop is observed for all three crises, suggesting that the oil price
is strongly related to the economy and market volatility.
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Figure 2.2: The oil price from 2007 to 2020
The initial drop in the oil price occurs between mid-2014 and the start of 2015 (59.2% fall over a 7-month
period). This period is defined as the Oil Crisis. We observe the second drop in the period between
mid-2015 until the start of 2016 (approximately 40% down). The latter drop is left out of our analysis.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015).Europe Brent Spot Price FOB.
2.7.3 The Covid-19 Crisis
The Covid-19 crisis hit the Scandinavian market in March 2020. The pandemic is still
ongoing, and is considered a special case of crisis since it has developed into both a
macroeconomic and financial crisis (Grytten, 2020). The virus is predicted to leave a
legacy even deeper and longer lasting than any prior crisis (Borio, 2020). The first case of
the respiratory virus was reported in China in December 2019, apparently transmitted
at a wholesale food market (World Health Organization, 2020). As of December 2020,
more than 70 million people has been infected, including 1.6 million deaths worldwide
(European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020). In contrast to the above-
mentioned crises, Covid-19 started out as a health crisis, affecting the real economy and
the supply side of production. Subsequently, lockdowns were self-imposed across countries
to limit contagion. In result, this affected the demand side of tourism and trade, thereby
influencing the viability of businesses and the financial sector. Enormous measures, in
a historical context, with regard to monetary and financial policies were implemented
worldwide. The attitude by central banks and governments were to limit the output
contraction, and the largest increase in unemployment ever seen.
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3 Main Hypothesis and Research Questions
3.1 Main Question and Hypothesis
The focus on fund performance in a crises context is of interest due to the following two
reasons: there are more opportunities available to active managers and a higher willingness
to pay amongst investors. The main goal is to figure out if Scandinavian active fund
managers deliver what they promise or if they “let a good crisis go to waste”. The main
research question is thus:
Do actively managed funds outperform in crisis relative to non-crisis,
and do we observe any differences across crises?
Whilst we observe that existing literature essentially contradicts active managers’ pitch
to outperform in crises, the desire is to find evidence that approves or disapproves this
perception. Do active managers receive an “unfair” amount of criticism or can existing
critical literature be justified? These questions motivate our main hypothesis:
“Actively managed funds outperform in crisis relative to non-crisis”
3.2 Additional Research Questions
In addition, cross-country variations and four debatable questions that extend the
interpretation of our main hypothesis will be explored. The following research questions
are identified.
• Does active fund performance vary across Scandinavian countries?
• Do funds with domestic investment focus perform better than funds with
international investment focus in crisis?
• Do funds with higher fees perform better than lower fee funds in crisis?
• Do funds with higher active share perform better than lower active share funds in
crisis?
• Does persistence exist for top performing funds even in times of crisis?
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4 Data
This section describes the collection and refinement of our data sample and variables. In
chronological order we present our sample selection, crises periods, variables of interest,
and lastly descriptive statistics.
4.1 Data Source and Sample Selection
The data is collected from the Lipper Fund Database. The original sample is a panel
dataset of 1075 open-ended mutual funds with monthly observations. The sample is
refined in accordance to previous studies to increase the robustness of estimates whilst
also avoiding selection bias. Each fund is represented by a unique Lipper-ID.
Time-period
Panel data includes both time-series and cross-sectional data. The time-series spans from
January 2007 until June 2020. This allows us to observe our sample’s fund performance
over a period of more than 13 years, specifically 162 months. Similar to Kacperczyk et al.
(2014), monthly observations are used, to increase the robustness of our sample compared
to that of annual observations. Further, we make no attempt to separate stock selection
from market timing during crisis, as this would require daily fund holdings over time.
Our data availability is too limited to assess this topic.
Domicile
Considering the underlying Scandinavian focus, the sample is restricted to funds domiciled
in Norway, Sweden and Denmark.8 The Scandinavian focus provides the option to consider
both region-specific and cross-country comparisons in our analysis. All Scandinavian
funds regardless of their geographical focus are included. If only Scandinavian funds
invested domestically were included, our sample would be significantly reduced.
Degree of active management
Following the definition of active management in chapter 2, our sample is refined to only
8In this thesis Scandinavia is defined as Norway, Sweden and Denmark.
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include actively managed funds. Subsequently, all index funds are removed, and the
remaining data sample leaves all funds with positive active share levels. For unleveraged
actively managed equity funds the active share ranges between 0% to 100%.
Incubated funds
In line with Elton, Gruber & Blake (2001) we exclude small funds, as these can translate
to extreme values in our sample. Kacperczyk et al. (2014) defines incubated funds as
those with TNA9 less than $5 million, and hence removes these from his dataset.10 In
comparison, Pastor & Vorsatz (2020) exclude all funds with TNA less than $15 million.
In this analysis funds with TNA less than $10 million are excluded.
Controlling for survivorship bias
The panel data we used is unbalanced, meaning that the funds are unequally represented
across the observed time-period. Survivorship bias is avoided by including both survivors
and non-survivors. If this is disregarded, the selection bias can potentially overestimate
the overall performance of active mutual funds (Elton et al., 1996).
Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of gross alpha after the sample refinement.
The full sample consists of 79,045 monthly observations for 883 funds, consisting of 353
Swedish funds, 189 Norwegian funds, and 341 Danish funds. As the table below shows,
the Swedish sample is the only country with a positive mean gross alpha. Both the
maximum and minimum gross alpha value, respectively 5.520 and -2.572, are represented
by two Swedish funds in the crisis-periods.11
Table 4.1: Summary statistics - Gross alpha
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 883 −0.066 0.460 −2.572 5.520
Sweden 353 0.010 0.562 −2.572 5.520
Norway 189 −0.102 0.439 −1.654 2.186
Denmark 341 −0.125 0.324 −1.282 1.835
9Total net assets (TNA).
10Incubated funds are special funds often launched with a trial period (Chen, 2018).
11See section 6.3 for control of maximum and minimum values (outliers).
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4.2 Data on Crises
From our total sample of 162 months approximately 14 months represent crisis periods,
hence 8.6% of our total observations. We use several sources to define the crisis periods
introduced in section 2.7.
4.2.1 Defining the Crises
Our data is based on monthly returns and the crisis periods will therefore be adjusted
to meet this criterion. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defines a
recession as a significant decline in economic activity that spreads across the economy and
lasts more than a few months. The recession period occurs between a peak of economic
activity and its subsequent through, or lowest point (NBER, 2020). Using the above
recession definition and dates, as well as macroeconomic events such as the oil price, we
define the Financial Crisis from September 2008 to March 2009, the Oil Crisis from June
2014 to January 2015, and the Covid-19 crisis from 20 February 2020 to 30 April 2020.
Nofsinger & Varma (2014) use the S&P500 index to define crisis periods for the US
market from October 2007 to March 2009. Both NBER and most of prior crises and fund
performance literature is based on the US market. Leite and Cortez (2015), however,
offer observations from the European market and use the MSCI EMU stock market index
to define the Financial Crisis between June 2007 and February 2009. Since our sample
represents the Scandinavian market, which is located further away from the US, the
recession period is less extensive than that of the US. The start of the crisis is defined as
the Lehman Brother collapse in September 2008 as this is highlighted as the event that
spread panic globally. The Covid-19 pandemic was somewhat different as it was initiated
by a virus, which subsequently led to lockdowns to limit contagion. The first virus case
and lockdown took place in Scandinavia at the same time as most European countries,
but somewhat earlier than the US. The crises periods examined in previous literature,
specifically the US, are not perfectly representing our Scandinavian sample, and hence
solely used for guidance.
According to the NBER database, the Oil Crisis in 2014 to 2016 is not defined as a
recession. We therefore use the development of the oil price as guidance. Using the
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definition of a recession as the period between the peak to the bottom, we base our oil
crisis definition on the first observed peak, and the following drop and bottom, which
occurred between mid-June 2014 to January 2015. The second drop occurred between
mid-2015 to early 2016 (Stocker, Baffes & Vorisek, 2018).12 Due to the extensive length
of the total oil price drop, the second drop is excluded from our analysis.
Table 4.2: Summary of crises
The Lehman Brother collapse on 15 September 2008 is here identified as the trigger event causing
worldwide panic and financial crisis. The end date is set to 31 March 2009 for our Scandinavian sample.
The Oil Crisis was initially marked by the sudden oil price peak and subsequent drop on June 23, 2014.
This continued until October 16th, before the market gradually rebounded around 31 January 2015. The
Covid-19 pandemic officially started when the stock market peaked on February 20th, continuing to
rapidly descend until March 23rd. On April 30th the market had largely rebounded and it marks the end
of the covid-19 crisis period in this thesis.
Crises Time period Length (months) Triggering event
Financial Sept. 2008-Mar. 2009 6 The Lehman Brother’s collapse
Oil Jun. 2014-Jan. 2015 6 The oil peak
Covid-19 Feb. 2020-Apr. 2020 2 The great lockdown
4.2.2 Market Events
To get a better understanding of how the crises impacted the Scandinavian financial
market we have included the OMXN40 index. OMXN40 is the Nordic stock market
index of the 40 most frequently traded stocks overall in the four Nordic markets: Sweden,
Denmark, Norway, and Finland. We chose this index instead of country specific indexes
due to diverging inception dates and currencies across different indexes. Figure 4.1 shows
market fluctuations in Scandinavia from 2007 until 2020, based on the OMXN40 index.
The OMXN40 index drops noticeably during the Financial Crisis and the Covid-19
pandemic, in line with the definitions above. This suggests that crisis does indeed affect
the financial market. Regarding the Oil Crisis, the stock price does not seem to drop
drastically until after the observed crisis period. It is a common-held simplified rule
stating that “stocks go up when oil goes down” (Fisher, 2019). Similarly, a relationship
exists between economic growth prospects, companies’ earnings and the stock price. The
various supply and demand factors at play are complex to comprehend in the context of
oil and stock prices, hence make no point to conclude on this here.
12The first drop was primarily driven by supply side factors. The second drop was primarily driven by
demand side factors.
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Figure 4.1: The Nordic Index from 2007 to 2020
Source: Nasdaq (2020). Index info OMXN40 - Nordic 40
A recent paper observed the performance of actively managed mutual funds during
the Covid-19 Crisis highlighting the production output contraction and the sudden
unemployment rise as two key reasons as to why this specific crisis offers a unique case for
active managers (Pástor & Vorsatz, 2020).
Further, the fiscal support pumped into the Scandinavian economy in response to Covid-19
might have impacted the market volatility. Each country’s government contributed with
liquidity, respectively 5.7% (2019 GDP) in Denmark, 4.2% (2020 GDP) in Norway and
16% (2019 GDP) in Sweden. In sum, this confirms that there are several aspects to
consider when defining a crisis period. In addition, research shows that economic growth
makes the financial intermediary role of mutual funds more important, specifically stating
that long-term mutual fund assets growth is strongly related to that of the gross domestic
product (GDP) (Plantier, 2014).
4.3 Selection of Variables
In this section we present our variables of interest and associated summary statistics. An
abbreviated table of variables can be found at the end of this section.
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4.3.1 Dependent Variable
Alpha is defined as the difference between a fund’s actual returns and its expected
performance. We use alpha unadjusted for risk, assuming a beta equal to 1. Our
analysis focuses specifically on gross alpha, which is the outperformance (positive alpha)
or underperformance (negative alpha) of return before subtracting fees. By using alpha as
a return measure it is possible to see if the fund manager’s strategy is effective. (Stein,
2018).
Gross alpha (before fees return) is the relevant measure of the manager’s ability to create
value. Our choice to use gross alpha as a return measure is inspired by Berk & van
Binsbergen (2015), who use the measure “value added” to find out if managers exhibit
skill and add value in order to outperform the index.13
To get a better understanding on the development of gross alpha in our sample, figure
4.2 shows the monthly and cumulative gross alpha over time. The cumulative return
represents the aggregate over- or underperformance (positive/negative alpha) for funds
over time, independent of the time perspective. We note that for the past eight years
gross alpha has stabilized close to zero.
Figure 4.2: Monthly and cumulative alpha over time
13Berk & van Binsbergen (2015) focus on “value added”, the product of assets under management
(AUM) and gross alpha. This results in a currency value, but we chose to only look at the return measure
gross alpha in our analysis.
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4.3.2 Independent Variables
Dummies
The mean gross alpha of the reference group represents the overall intercept in the model,
and each group’s dummy coefficient represents the estimated deviation from the reference
group (Wooldridge, 2013). Hence, by including dummies, we allow the intercept to change
over time. Dummies are binary variables that take the value of 0, or if the condition is
met value equal to 1. The interpretation of dummies is based on the assumption that all
other factors remain constant.
Crisis periods
In the main analysis, we introduce a dummy for the pooled crisis period, which represents
all periods defined as crisis in our sample. Further, we add dummies for the three crises
separately. This allows us to observe how fund performance vary in crisis versus in
non-crisis, as well as across crises.
Interaction terms
To further explore the effect of active management in crises, we include interaction terms
to capture the effect of investment focus, fees and active share in crisis. The presence and
interaction between two independent variables can influence the result of the dependent
variable. Thus, we add interaction terms between the crisis dummy variable and the
independent dummy variables. The addition of the interaction term allows us to observe
changes in fund performance as a result of different investment focus, levels of fees and
active share in crisis.
Domestic investment focus
To capture the effect of domestically focused funds, we add a dummy variable called
domestic, which represents the funds’ domicile. The dummy domestic is 1 if the
geographical investment focus equals the domicile. This allows for a distinction between
internationally invested and domestically invested funds. In order to consider if
domestically invested funds outperform internationally invested funds in crisis, we create
an interaction term domestic:crisis between the dummy variables domestic and crisis.
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This interaction term will capture the effect of domestic fund performance in crisis. The
reference group is international funds in non-crisis.
Level of fees
Next, we introduce a dummy for fees to further explore the effect of different levels of fees
on gross alpha. First, our sample is split into two groups based on high and low fees. The
low fees group includes the funds with fees lower than 1.62% and represents the reference
group (low fees in non-crisis). This cutoff is based on our sample median of 1.62%. High
fee funds receive the value 1, and low fee funds receives the value 0. By including the high
fee dummy, it is possible to observe whether high fee funds outperform low fee funds in
non-crisis.
To further answer our research question on fees, we create an interaction term for high fee
funds in crisis. The interaction term high fees:crisis is created to capture the additional
performance effect of high fee funds in crisis. This allows us to observe whether high fee
funds outperform low fee funds in crisis.
Level of active share
We introduce dummies for active share to further explore the effect of different levels of
active share on gross alpha. In order to assess the level of active management on fund
performance, we split our sample into three groups based on low, middle, and high active
share. The reference group is low active share (0-60%) in non-crisis. The middle and
high active share group receive the value 0 and 1, respectively. The coefficient mid active
represents middle active share (60-80%) funds in non-crisis and high active represents
high active share (80-100%) funds in non-crisis. By including these dummies for high and
middle active share, it is possible to observe whether funds with higher levels of active
share outperform funds with lower levels of active share in non-crisis.
To further answer our research question on the level of active management, two interaction
terms mid active:crisis and high active:crisis are created to capture the effect of different
levels of active management on performance in crisis. The interaction terms allow us
to observe whether funds with higher levels of active share outperform funds with lower
active share in crisis.
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4.3.3 Control Variables
Previous literature present numerous control variables in order to increase the precision of
our estimates. Similar to Kacperczyk et al. (2014) and Petajisto (2013), we include the
following control variables: fees, active share, age, TNA, and net flow.
Fund fees and active share are included as control variables throughout our analysis, in
addition to including them as independent variables in separate regressions. The annual
fund fee is calculated by dividing total fund expenses with the total fund assets under
management. Higher fees often accompany active funds managed by high-profile managers
(Napoletano & Curry, 2020). As previously mentioned, we use active share to measure the
degree of active management. However, due to missing data for active share, the sample
size is reduced by approximately 50% when controlling for active share. Consequently,
active share works as a control variable, but should not be heavily relied on in our main
analysis.
Further, the natural logarithm of a fund’s age in years since inception is included. We
use the natural logarithm due to the non-linear relationship between age and gross alpha.
We include the funds’ total net assets measured at the end of each month as a control
variable. Similar to age, we use the natural logarithm of TNA in million dollars due
to the non-linear relationship between TNA and gross alpha.14 Lastly, the funds’ net
flows represents the net value of cash in- and outflow of each individual fund. A positive
net flow provides excess cash that the manager can use to invest. An increase in the
aggregate level of inflows and outflows are also found to be associated with more volatile
markets, thus an interesting control factor in the context of crises and fund performance
(Thenmozhi & Kumar, 2009).
Table 4.3: Summary statistics - Control variables
Table 4.3 shows that the our sample has a mean fund fee of 1.65% and a mean active share of 71.72%.
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Fund fee (%) 1.65 0.59 0.10 4.46
Active share (%) 71.72 20.41 22.33 100.23
Fund TNA (million) 256 517 10 4,632
Net flow (%) 1.37 7.56 −19.52 118.10
Fund age 11.12 8.17 0.21 46.33
14See appendix for the purpose of linearity regarding fund age and TNA.
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Table 4.4: Description of variables
Dependent variable Definition
Gross Alpha Fund portfolio performance relative to its benchmark (before fees)
Independent variables Definition
Crisis Indicator variable equal to 1 for every month the economy is in crisis
Financial Indicator variable equal to 1 for every month the economy is in The Financial Crisis
Oil Indicator variable equal to 1 for every month the economy is in The Oil Crisis
Covid Indicator variable equal to 1 for every month the economy is in The Covid-19 Crisis
Domestic Indicator variables equal to one if the fund investment focus is domestic
Domestic:crisis Interaction term that captures the effect of domestic investment focus in crisis period
High fee Fund fee above 1.62% (sample median)
Mid Active Level of active share 60% ≤ 80%
High Active Level of active share >80%
Control Variables Definition
Fund fee Total expense ratio, annual
Active share The percentage of a fund’s portfolio deviating from the benchmark portfolio
Fund age The natural logarithm of fund age in years
Fund TNA The natural logarithm of a fund total net assets in million USD
Net flow The net of all cash inflows and outflows of the fund in percent
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5 Methodology
In the following chapter, the regression equations are introduced to explore and potentially
approve or reject the main hypothesis and additional research questions presented in
chapter 3.
5.1 Fund Performance in Crises
This section presents the basic regression model applied in our analysis. We apply the same
regression to answer our main question “Do actively managed funds outperform in crisis
relative to non-crisis”, as well as the research questions on cross-crisis and cross-country
differences. The skeleton of our model is inspired by Kacperczyk et al. (2014).15 Further,
we expand our model with the variables described in section 4.3. The main regression
model is applied to find the performance measure gross alpha. See appendix A1 for a
table linking the mathematical expressions to regression variables.
5.1.1 Main Model with Pooled Crises
To answer the question of whether actively managed funds outperform in crisis relative to
non-crisis, the first model is regressing the dependent variable gross alpha for fund i at
time t with a crisis-dummy.
αgrossit = β0 + δ1D
crisis
t + vit (5.1)
5.1.2 Main Model with Separate Crises
To explore the individual crises, equation 5.2 includes additional crisis dummies to control
and capture the effect of each crisis on fund performance. This equation is applied for
each Scandinavian country to observe potential country differences, as was raised in the
second research question.
15Kacperczyk et al. (2014) who review manager skills separating timing and stock-picking in recession
and expansion. Due to data limitation, such as stock weightings, the model applied in this thesis is
constricted to gross alpha
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t + vit (5.2)
The crisis coefficients display gross alpha (fund performance) in crisis relative to the
intercept determined by the reference group gross alpha in non-crisis.
5.1.3 Main Model with Control Variables
Similar to the model of Kacperczyk et al. (2014), the model above is expanded with
control variables. Regression equations 5.1 and 5.2 are expanded with the vector Xit for
more precise estimates and robust results, respectively equation 5.3 and 5.4. The vector
represents fund characteristics that change over time.16 The coefficient β1 represents
individual fund characteristics, namely control variables.
αgrossit = β0 + δ1D
crisis
t + β1Xit + vit (5.3)






t + β1Xit + vit (5.4)
In panel data regressions, the error term vit consists of both idiosyncratic risk and
unobserved effects. The risk of omitted variable bias in the error term is somewhat
mitigated by including fund characteristics. If used correctly, panel data models are
particularly capable of handling challenges associated with the error term.17
5.2 Fund Performance with Interaction Terms
To better understand and offer answers to the additional research questions related to
investment focus, fund fees, and level of activity, the regression models are expanded
with interaction terms. Equations 5.3 and 5.4 are expanded with dummies representing
domestic investment focus. However, to limit the scope of this thesis, the remaining
research questions on fees and active share are only considered for the pooled crisis period
16Active share is added as a control variable, however, not included in the main findings table. This is
due to missing values, which in turn significantly reduce the original sample. See appendix.
17See appendix for robustness of the model and handling of the error term.
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(extension of equation 5.3). In result, neither cross-country nor crises differences are taken
into consideration for the questions on fees and active share.
5.2.1 Domestic Investment Focus
The domestic dummy represents an additional layer to our analysis. This variable
captures the effect of funds invested in the domestic market (locally). The interaction
term domestic:crisis measures the effect of funds with domestic investment focus in crisis.
Equations 5.5 and 5.6 represent equations 5.3 and 5.4 with dummies and interaction terms
for domestic. This analysis is also applied for each individual crisis to observe whether
domestic investment focus varies between the crises.






t ·Ddomestici ) + β1Xit + vit (5.5)











t ·Ddomestici ) + γ3(Doilt ·Ddomestici ) + γ4(Dcovidt ·Ddomestici ) + β1Xit + vit
(5.6)
5.2.2 Level of Fees
To explore the effect of fees in crisis, a dummy for high fees is included. See section 4.3
for a description of the fee sample. The interaction term high fees:crisis measures the
effect of higher fees in crisis. Equation 5.7 is the expanded version of equation 5.3 with
dummies and interaction terms for high fee.








i ) + β1Xit + vit (5.7)
5.2.3 Level of Active Share
As explained in section 4.3, the sample is split in three groups dependent on the level of
active share. The dummy coefficients for mid active and high active represent the effects
on fund performance for different levels of active share. Two interaction terms are added
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to the model to observe the effect in crisis and observe the performance difference between
higher levels of active share funds in crisis to that of lower active share funds. Equation
5.8 is an extended version of equation 5.3 with dummies and interaction terms for mid
active and high active.









t ·Dmidactivei ) + γhighactive(Dcrisist ·D
highactive
i ) + β1Xit + vit
(5.8)
5.3 Persistence amongst Top Performers
The next model is used to identify persistence amongst top performing funds. The simple
model is used to identify whether the same winning and losing funds persist even through
times of crises. The observation will hopefully give an indication of manager skill in the
Scandinavian fund market pre-crisis, in crisis and post-crisis. Equation 5.9 illustrates how






The same pool of funds are considered pre-crisis, in crisis, and post-crisis.18 The top 25%
(Q1) performers as well as the bottom 25% (Q4) performers are identified based on the
pre-crisis mean gross alpha. This is repeated for each crisis, namely the Financial Crisis,
the Oil Crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, the mean gross alpha of the same top
and bottom performing funds are extracted for the crisis period and the post-crisis period.
Further, the position is set to long in the Q1 group and short in the Q4 group, in order
to observe if the relationship changes from that of the pre-crisis period. The observed
difference indicates whether the mean gross alpha of top performing funds change between
pre-crisis, in crisis and post-crisis. A positive difference indicate that the top and bottom
performers remain the same, whilst a negative difference indicates a change. This will
provide an indication to whether persistence exist.
18The pre-crisis and post-crisis periods have the same length as each crisis.
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6 Findings
In this chapter we review the findings of our main hypothesis and additional research
questions defined in chapter 3. First, we look at overall fund performance in the
Scandinavian market. Second, we present the findings of our additional research questions
on fund performance in crisis both cross-country and within-country. Third, we present
the findings regarding the effect of high fees and high active share in crisis. Lastly, we
present the findings in regards to persistence amongst top performers. The variables are
explained in section 4.3. Further, see A1 in appendix for the link between variables and
mathematical expressions from the equations in chapter 5.
6.1 Main Research Question
6.1.1 Do actively managed funds outperform in crisis relative to
non-crisis?
Table 6.1 shows the findings in relation to our main question as to whether actively
managed funds outperform in crisis relative to in non-crisis. In columns 1 and 2, looking at
the overall result before controls are added, we observe that actively managed Scandinavian
funds perform worse in crisis than in non-crisis. Considering gross alpha is expressed in
monthly measures, we observe that active funds underperform by approximately 20 basis
points (bps) per month, or 2.5% annually in crisis periods, relative to non-crisis periods.
The results are significant at the 1% level and economically significant across models.
When we split the crisis period into financial, oil and covid we observe similar negative
results, respectively by approximately 1.9% annually in the Financial Crisis, 1.2% in the
Oil Crisis and 16.9% in Covid-19.19 The results are significant at the 1% and 5% level,
and of particular economic significance in the Covid-19 Crisis.
Overall, these findings do not support our hypothesis of fund outperformance in crisis
relative to in non-crisis. Thus, our findings do not find that active managers add value by
outperforming in recessions like Kacperczyk et al. (2014) and Kowoski (2011).20 Yet, we
19Numbers presented as annual measures.
20See e.g. Glode (2011) and Kosowski (2011).
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further analyse performance in crisis prior to revisiting the theme in chapter 7 Discussion.
Table 6.1: Fund performance in crises
The table below depicts the effect of the pooled crisis period (crisis) as well as each individual crises
(financial, oil, covid) on gross alpha. The pooled OLS models are displayed in columns 1 and 2, and
represent the actual (real) effect of crisis on gross alpha. The different results in columns 3 and 4 can be
attributed to the added controls of the following fund characteristics: fund age, size (TNA), net flow and
fees. Columns 5 and 6 show the results after controlling for fund fixed effects. See appendix for more
information on controls and fixed effects. The mean gross alpha is not present in the table, however, it
remains negative across models. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis, clustered at the fund level (see
appendix). Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Gross Alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
crisis -0.212∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
financial -0.164∗∗ -0.151∗ -0.219∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.081) (0.084)
oil -0.099∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.089∗∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
covid -1.408∗∗∗ -1.416∗∗∗ -1.377∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.263) (0.265)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 79,045 79,045 76,543 76,543 76,543 76,543
R2 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.017 0.019
6.2 Additional Research Questions
To gain a better understanding of Scandinavian fund performance in crisis, we present
five additional research question. This section touches two main themes. The first focuses
on cross-country and within-country differences. The second, presents the findings of the
much-disputed topics fees and active share, and persistence.
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Figure 6.1: Country differences in mean gross alpha across crises
Figure 6.1 presents three visual analyses of country differences across crises. This illustrates valuable
insight on performance differences prior to the formal regression analyses. During the Financial Crisis the
mean gross alpha does not deviate remarkably across the Scandinavian funds. Can this homogeneous
result suggest the financial crisis was equally relevant for all three countries? A crisis far away from
home? During the Oil Crisis, the performance of Norwegian funds were slightly more volatile than that
of the other countries. Norwegian funds display positive alphas, and we question if this can be due to the
local information advantage about the oil market. In the middle of the crisis period, all three countries
fluctuates around zero gross alpha - does this imply less market volatility? In the second part of the
crisis, the positive gross alpha peak for Norwegian funds imply that there exist greater opportunities
to catch alpha in the Norwegian market and/or better Norwegian active managers. The performance
level was overall worse in the Covid-19 compared to the other crises. Norway displays a significant drop
in performance halfway through the crisis period. Can the oil price drop potentially explain the lower
alpha observed in the Norwegian market compared to its Scandinavian peers? Did the oil price create an
additional challenge for Norwegian managers? With these conceptual differences in mind, we continue
with our formal analysis.
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6.2.1 Does active fund performance vary across Scandinavian
countries?
Table 6.2 reports the findings in relation to our additional research question on variations
in fund performance across Scandinavia in crisis. In panel A we observe cross-country
differences for the pooled crisis period. In columns 1 and 2 we observe that Swedish funds
underperform by approximately 2.2% annually in crisis relative to non-crisis. Regarding
Norwegian funds, the underperformance is approximately 6.7% annually as seen in columns
3 and 4.21 In sum, we observe meaningful results for Sweden and Norway regarding crisis
overall. The results for Denmark are neither significant nor economically significant as
seen in columns 5 and 6 (approximately 0.6% annually).22
In columns 2, 4 and 6 of panel B, we observe the financial, oil and covid coefficients
implying the effect on gross alpha in different crises across countries. As seen in columns
1 and 2, Swedish funds perform worse in all separate crisis compared to non-crisis,
by respectively 2.2% (financial), 1.6% (oil) and 6.4% (covid) annually. However, the
results are only significant in the Financial and Oil Crisis. In columns 3 and 4, we
observe that Norwegian funds performed worse in the Financial Crisis and Covid-19,
by approximately 6.9% and 67% annually. The results are significant at the 1% level
and economically significant. We further observe that Norwegian funds outperformed
in the Oil Crisis compared to non-crisis by approximately 0.5%. This is an interesting
observation considering Norway’s exposure to the oil market, which we will elaborate in
chapter 7 Discussion. In columns 5 and 6, we observe that Danish funds received a higher
alpha of approximately 0.7% in the Financial Crisis relative to in non-crisis. Regarding
the oil and Covid-19 crises, Danish funds underperform by approximately 1.8% and 0.6%.
The results are significant in the Oil Crisis, yet of small magnitude.
In sum, the findings remain consistent with those observed in section 6.1, suggesting that
funds underperform in crisis relative to non-crisis independent of country. The results are
in line with prior Scandinavian studies on fund performance showing no significant results
21Numbers show annual changes to performance in crisis periods, namely coefficients multiplied by 12.
22Due to relatively consistent results, the table displays results for each country before and after
controlling for fund characteristics and fixed effects. Extensive tables including control variables and fixed
effects for individual countries can be found in the appendix.
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of outperformance.23 However, some cross-country differences across crises are observed,
which we will revisit in chapter 7 Discussion.
Table 6.2: Fund performance across Scandinavia in crises
Panel A shows the effect of the pooled crisis period (crisis). Panel B shows the effect of each individual
crisis (financial, oil, covid) on gross alpha across the three Scandinavian countries. Columns 1, 3 and 5
show the real effect on gross alpha for the entire sample per individual domicile, respectively Sweden,
Norway and Denmark. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the results with added controls for fund characteristics:
fund age, TNA, net flow and fees, as well as fund fixed effects controls. See appendix for more information
on controls and fixed effects, as well as extended tables for each country. Standard errors are shown in
parenthesis, clustered at the fund level (see appendix). Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Panel A: Performance with pooled crisis
Gross Alpha
SE SE NO NO DK DK
crisis -0.182∗∗ -0.185∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.056
(0.075) (0.077) (0.129) (0.132) (0.066) (0.067)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 28,933 28,922 17,912 17,566 32,200 30,055
R2 0.001 0.024 0.004 0.019 0.0001 0.012
Panel B: Performance with separate crises
Gross Alpha
SE SE NO NO DK DK
financial -0.183∗ -0.211∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.745∗∗∗ 0.064 0.087
(0.108) (0.117) (0.201) (0.208) (0.124) (0.137)
oil -0.134∗∗ -0.125∗ 0.044 0.098 -0.143∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.064) (0.148) (0.150) (0.048) (0.048)
covid -0.530 -0.473 -5.580∗∗∗ -5.655∗∗∗ -0.043 0.050
(0.398) (0.393) (0.574) (0.587) (0.346) (0.353)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 28,933 28,922 17,912 17,566 32,200 30,055
R2 0.001 0.024 0.028 0.045 0.0003 0.012
23See Flam and Vestman, 2014; Christensen, 2013; Sørensen, 2010.
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6.2.2 Do funds with domestic investment focus perform better
than funds with international investment focus in crisis?
To get a deeper understanding of the observed cross-country differences in fund performance
across crises, we add a domestic dummy and the associated interaction term.
In table 6.3 panel A, in columns 1, 3 and 5, the variable domestic shows that for the
pooled crisis, domestically invested funds tend to outperform internationally invested
funds in non-crisis. Domestically focused Swedish funds outperform by approximately
2.6% annually, Norwegian funds by approximately 3.2% and Danish funds by 0.7%. All
results are significant at the 1% level and in line with Coval and Moskowitz (2001) who
proposed that managers investing a significant part of their assets locally perform better.
Further, we observe that the coefficient domestic remains at the level of statistical and
economic significance in columns 2, 4 and 6. However, by including the interaction
term domestic:crisis, we observe positive values for Norwegian funds (16.1% annually)
in contrast to Swedish (1.2%) and Danish funds (4.6%). The interaction term captures
the difference in slope coefficient between international and domestic funds in crisis. It is
worth noting that the results are only significant for Norwegian and Danish funds.
Panel B, considering each individual crisis, we observe that the domestic coefficient results
are consistent to the observations in panel A. Interestingly, both Swedish and Norwegian
funds with international investment focus significantly underperform in the Financial
Crisis relative to non-crisis, respectively at 2.2% and 6.9% annually.
However, when interaction terms are included to determine the difference between funds
with international versus domestic investment focus in each individual crisis and per
country, the coefficients reveal some interesting results.24 Across all countries, positive
coefficients are observed in the Financial Crisis, which indicates that funds with domestic
investment focus performed better in this period. However, the results are only significant
for Norwegian funds.
24The total effect between domestically invested funds and internationally invested funds in crisis are
obtained by adding domestic:crises + domestic, which ultimately gives: Sweden -0.097 + 0.224 = 0.127,
Denmark -0.386 + 0.091 = 0.295, Norway 1.341 + 0.165 = 1.506
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Table 6.3: Fund performance dependent on investment focus in crises
The tables below illustrate the performance dependent on the funds’ investment focus. Panel A shows the
effect of domestic investment focus for the pooled crisis period (crisis). Panel B shows the effect of each
individual crisis (financial, oil, covid) on gross alpha across the three Scandinavian countries. In contrast
to the above-mentioned tables, the entire sample is split into three different samples based on domicile.
In addition to the pooled crisis variable, we observe gross alpha when controlling for domestic investment
focus (domestic) in columns 1, 3 and 5, respectively Sweden, Norway and Denmark. To better capture
the effect of domestically focused funds in crisis, the interaction term (domestic:crisis) is included. The
interaction term is included in columns 2, 4 and 6. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis, clustered at
the fund level (see appendix). Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Panel A: Domestic vs. international pooled crisis
Gross Alpha
SE SE NO NO DK DK
crisis -0.181∗∗ -0.150 -0.555∗∗∗ -0.990∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.006
(0.075) (0.095) (0.128) (0.155) (0.066) (0.074)
domestic 0.216∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.036) (0.023) (0.025)
domestic:crisis -0.097 1.341∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.201) (0.123)
Observations 28,933 28,933 17,912 17,912 32,200 32,200
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.012 0.0002 0.0005
Panel B: Domestic vs. international separate crises
Gross Alpha
SE SE NO NO DK DK
financial -0.186∗ -0.257∗ -0.573∗∗∗ -0.841∗∗∗ 0.065 0.061
(0.108) (0.131) (0.200) (0.276) (0.124) (0.138)
oil -0.132∗∗ -0.096 0.051 -0.772∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.087) (0.147) (0.118) (0.048) (0.053)
covid -0.514 0.056 -5.580∗∗∗ -3.849∗∗∗ -0.044 0.863∗∗
(0.399) (0.484) (0.575) (0.682) (0.347) (0.341)
domestic 0.216∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.029) (0.036) (0.036) (0.024) (0.025)
domestic:financial 0.205 0.817∗∗ 0.041
(0.229) (0.341) (0.208)
domestic:oil -0.115 2.574∗∗∗ 0.129
(0.117) (0.192) (0.104)
domestic:covid -2.238∗∗∗ -5.029∗∗∗ -6.356∗∗∗
(0.767) (1.020) (0.651)
Observations 28,933 28,933 17,912 17,912 32,200 32,200
R2 0.003 0.004 0.031 0.047 0.0004 0.007
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On the contrary, the interaction terms are significantly negative for all Scandinavian
countries in Covid-19, on an annual basis, respectively 26.9% for Swedish funds, 60.3%
for Norwegian funds, and 76.3% for Danish funds. The results is considered to be of
high economic significance at the 1% level. Moreover, the interaction term for Norwegian
domestic funds in the Oil Crisis is positive by 30.9% annually at the 1% significance level25.
This is an interesting observation considering Norway’s oil dependence.
In sum, the findings suggest that funds with domestic investment focus perform better than
that of funds with international investment focus in crisis. The tendency of domestically
invested funds to outperform relative to internationally invested funds in crisis deserves a
further discussion. This "close to home" vs. "far away" analogy will be further mentioned
in chapter 7 Discussion.
6.2.3 Do funds with higher fees perform better than lower fee
funds in crisis?
In table 6.4 we consider the level of fees in relation to fund performance in crisis relative
to non-crisis. The sample is split in two groups: high and low fees, see 4.3. The coefficient
high fees indicates that high fee funds perform worse than low fee funds by approximately
0.9% annually during the non-crisis period.26 The results are significant and consistent
across models. The interaction term high fee:crisis, however, indicates that gross alpha of
high fee funds differ from that of low fee funds by a positive 1.9% annually in crisis. The
result is significant at the 10% level and economically significant.27 Although high fee
funds might not be worth the investment in non-crisis, our results suggest that the same
funds can be worth the investment in crisis. This suggests that the premium paid can in
the context of crisis work as an "insurance".
Our results indicate that high fee funds do not offer a competitive advantage relative to low
fee funds in non-crisis. However, higher fees in crisis yields outperformance. This suggests
that active managers are worthy of their high fees in crisis. These findings are aligned
with Glode (2011) who suggests that the performance of high fee funds is countercyclical.
25Positive but insignificant results for Danish funds.
26This corresponds with our results on fund fees as a control variable (see extended tables in appendix),
suggesting that fund fees are negatively associated with fund performance.
27The total effect of higher fees in crisis, high fees:crisis + high fees: 0.159 + -0.076 = 0.083
6.2 Additional Research Questions 37
The results also support Kosowski (2011) who emphasized that investors’ higher marginal
utility of consumption during recessions increase their willingness to pay for "insurance"
in crisis. These findings will be further discussed, see section 7 Discussion.
Table 6.4: Fund performance dependent on the level of fees in crisis
The table shows the effect of different levels of fees, in particular high fee on gross alpha in crisis. The
pooled OLS model is applied on column 1 and represents the real effect of high fees on gross alpha during
crisis. In contrast, column 2 include added controls for fund characteristics: fund age, size (TNA), net
flow and fees. In addition, controls for fund fixed effects are added in column 3. To better understand
the how gross alpha varies in crisis dependent on the funds fee levels, the interaction term high fee:crisis
is created. This term capture the effect of high fee funds in crisis relative to lower fee funds in crisis.




crisis -0.290∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
high fee -0.076∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.037)
high fee:crisis 0.159∗ 0.160∗ 0.164∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
Controls No Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 76,543 76,543 76,543
R2 0.001 0.002 0.017
6.2.4 Do funds with higher active share perform better than
lower active share funds in crisis?
In table 6.5 we observe how the level of active share relates to fund performance in crisis
relative to non-crisis. The sample is divided into three groups based on low, middle and
high active share, see section 4.3. The crisis coefficient is negative, which implies worse
performance for funds with lower active share in crisis compared to non-crisis. This result
is consistent with the previous results suggesting that overall worse fund performance in
crisis.
Moreover, the increasingly negative coefficients, respectively negative mid active and high
active, suggest a downward performance trend as the level of active share increases. The
interaction terms, mid active:crisis and high active:crisis, indicate that the performance
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(gross alpha) for mid active funds drops by an additional 1.5% annually in crisis. Similarly,
high active funds drop by 4.2% annually. Both results are relative to low active share
funds in crisis. The worse performance of high active funds remains consistent as the level
of active share increases. high active:crisis is the only interaction effect with significant
coefficients in the table .
It is common to assume that greater portfolio deviations from the index, the easier it will
be to beat the benchmark. Yet, our results suggest the opposite as higher active share
displays worse performance. This finding also contradicts Cremers & Pestajisto (2009)
who suggest that funds with high active share (>60%) outperform the benchmark before
fees.28 The result makes us question whether it is worth paying for funds with higher
active share in crisis, which will be further discussed in chapter 7 Discussion.
Table 6.5: Fund performance dependent on the level of active share in crisis
This table shows how gross alpha varies in crisis dependent on different levels of active share (active mid,
active high). The pooled OLS models is applied in column 1 to observe the real effect on gross alpha in
crisis dependent on middle and high levels of active share sample. In contrast, column 2 include added
controls for fund characteristics: fund age, TNA, net flow and fees. In addition, controls for fund fixed
effects are added in column 3. The interaction terms mid active:crisis and high active:crisis are created
to better capture the effect on gross alpha in crisis based on higher levels of active share compared to
that of lower active share. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis, clustered at the fund level (see
appendix). Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Gross Alpha
(1) (2) (3)
crisis -0.186∗ -0.160∗ -0.160∗
(0.096) (0.095) (0.097)
mid active -0.072∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.023) (0.023) (0.039)
high active -0.099∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.027) (0.028) (0.058)
mid active:crisis -0.122 -0.145 -0.174
(0.161) (0.162) (0.164)
high active:crisis -0.347∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.146) (0.148)
Controls No Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 37,034 36,362 36,362
R2 0.004 0.005 0.033
28Notably, our sample is significantly reduced when including active share, more on the inference of
these results in section 6.3 on robustness.
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6.2.5 Does persistence exist for top performing funds even in
times of crisis?
In table 6.6 we see the results of the simple model used to assess persistence in our sample.
These results do not show fund specific effects; yet the results illustrate the relationship
between the top performing funds (Q1) and the bottom performing funds (Q4) to observe
if performance persist across pre-crisis, in crisis, and post-crisis.
The results suggest that the same top performing funds persist. This is confirmed by
the positive sign suggesting that the mean gross alpha of the top 25% performing funds
pre-crisis still outcompete that of the bottom 25% performing funds in crisis. Similarly,
the difference is observed for the post-crisis period to check if the underperforming funds
during crisis and post-crisis persist.
Table 6.6 shows that the persistence exist for top and bottom performing funds pre-crisis,
during crisis, and post crisis for both the Oil Crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. These
results are in line with the findings on Kacperczyk et al. (2014), who find that the same
top performing funds outperform independent of the state of the economy. This indicates
that skilled managers potentially exist and engage in investment strategies to outperform
both in crisis and non-crisis periods. The later will not be further assessed in our thesis.
However, the results in the Financial Crisis flips from positive to negative in post-crisis.
This suggests that the mean gross alpha of the bottom performing funds pre-crisis and in
the Financial Crisis exceed the mean value of the top performing funds post-crisis. In
other words, performance persistence does not exist for funds pre-, during and post the
financial crisis. More on this in chapter 7 Discussion.








This section covers the robustness of our empirical findings. We emphasize the robustness
of our models to ensure that the applied models are correctly specified and can provide
unbiased and efficient estimates.
6.3.1 Statistical inference and control variables
Even though the results are highly significant with small p-values, it is still necessary to
be aware of the statistical interpretation of our results and potential lack of it (Fornell,
Mithas & Morgeson, 2009). Our intention is to better understand if active managers
create value during crisis in Scandinavia and whether it is possible to draw interesting
inferences from the regression results. Robustness is key in an econometric sense, but we
prefer to still include interesting observations despite the lack of statistical inference, yet
with great caution to final conclusions.
Control variables
The results are consistent when controlling for fund characteristics and fixed effects.
We observe that the model fit, R-squared, increases when controlling for other fund
characteristics and fixed effects. Due to the scope of our thesis, none of the control
variables, except fees and active share are used in further regression models for individual
assessments. See appendix for extended regression tables with control variables.
The control variable fund fee suggests that higher fund fees are related to worse fund
performance, before controlling for fixed effects. The relationship between higher fees and
worse performance is suggested in previous research (see section 7.3).
When including active share as a control variable, the sample is reduced drastically (by
53%) due to missing values in the dataset. In result, regressions including active share
should not be heavily relied on. Note that a new dataset is extracted in the separate
analysis on level of active share and fund performance, which does not rely on the
inclusion of other variables in the dataset.
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Data limitations
A smaller sample size has a negative effect on the statistical power (Fornell et al., 2009).
In our sample we observe abnormal returns for Norwegian funds. This is worth noting, as
observed in Table 4.1 the sample of Norwegian funds is smaller than that of Swedish and
Danish funds.
Further, we observe abnormal results for Covid-19. There are several aspects to this, one
being the amount of time, as Covid-19 is restricted to two months in our sample. Second,
previous state-dependent studies on fund performance consider milder recession periods.
Thus, the results of Covid-19 are difficult to compare to the findings of previous studies
on fund performance in recession.
The oil crisis period was limited to the first drop in the oil price, and did not include the
second drop. The performance results can therefore be misrepresenting the total effect of
the oil crisis. However, the decision to exclude the second drop was based on the idea of
including comparative similar length crises, and hence the Oil Crisis length was restricted.
A particular issue arises with fund fees as they are listed on an annual basis. Consequently,
our original sample does not include fund fees for the months of 2020. The issue is
resolved by replacing the missing values with the last observed fee (2019) for each
individual fund. Glode (2011) computed total fund fees over seven-year holding periods.29
For that reason, the inserted values of fund fees are controlled against seven-year averages.
Dealing with outliers
With a sample of 79,045 observations and 883 funds we do not consider outliers to cause
biased estimates in our sample. Smaller samples have higher chances of outliers (Osborne
& Overbay, 2004). When plotting individual mean gross alphas over time, a couple of
outliers are identified. We control for these values in our regression analysis, but do not
find evidence that they affect the implications of our results. Thus, the outliers are not
removed.
29Average holding period for equity mutual funds (Sirri & Tufano, 1998)
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6.3.2 Model specifications
To observe the actual loss (gain) of fund value during crisis, we include regressions both
before and after controlling for fund characteristics and fixed effects. However, considering
the use of panel data, challenges such as heteroscedasticity and serial correlation arise. To
account for these challenges, standard errors are clustered at the fund level in accordance




In this section, we further discuss the empirical findings from chapter 6. The goal is
to draw interesting inferences between our findings and the real world. What are the
implications of our results and what can we learn from them? This discussion aims to
demystify our results, and at the same time set the scene for further research in the field
(see chapter 9 Limitations and Further Research).
7.1 Impact of active management in crises
The findings in our thesis allow us to reject our hypothesis “Actively managed funds
outperform in crisis relative to non-crisis” – the pitch of active managers remains unproved.
That said, the discussion of this result is far more complex and extensive. One might ask,
why do active funds underperform in crises?
7.1.1 Fund performance in crisis
Crises are times of stock market anomalies, in other words offering potential market
inefficiency opportunities that active managers can harvest (Brunnermeier & Oehmke,
2013). Our findings indicate that active managers do not appear able to exploit these
inefficiencies during crisis.
The modern asset management industry is “a different story” than what it once was. The
underperformance of active funds tends to be blamed solely on the manager; however,
we question whether a partial explanation is linked to fundamental industry changes.
Collectively, our findings support the notion that during recessions investors seek liquidity
and index tracking funds as revenues are drying up and unemployment rises (Osborne &
Clarke, 2020). Market efficiency, tougher competition, tighter margins and outflow are
some of the key trends that possibly explain why active managers struggle to live up to
their pitch.
Revisiting Figure 4.2 (gross alpha over time), we observe greater fluctuations in gross
alpha in the Financial Crisis than in Covid-19. This suggests that the increasing flows
of information and market transparency in recent years, make it more costly and time-
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consuming for active managers to seek alpha, and hence more difficult to outperform.
7.1.2 Fund performance across crises
Although no crisis is a clone of another, there are always lessons to be learned from
one crisis to the next. The Financial Crisis offered an opportunity for the government
and regulators to experiment and figure out how to respond to a crisis and how to best
support their economies. It taught the world the importance of having a robust and
well-functioning banking sector. We suspect that the Scandinavian Banking Crisis in 1990
was “a blessing in disguise” for the Scandinavian economy as it potentially helped prepare
the Scandinavian banking sector for the Global Financial Crisis eighteen years later. The
resilient financial system in Scandinavia can help ease volatility and uncertainty in crisis.
In result, active managers have more predictable preconditions to perform because more
noise is removed.
In contrast to the Financial Crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, although starting out as a health
crisis, had massive implications far beyond the spread of the virus. The resulting lockdown
in the spring of 2020 has been accompanied with severe financial and macroeconomic
consequences, thus limiting the time for managers to utilize opportunities. The global
scale as well as the complex and interconnected factors affecting the financial markets
make Covid-19 a challenging environment to navigate for active managers.
To sum up, the effects of a crisis on the financial market can determine how well an active
manager responds and eventually performs. Although both the Financial Crisis and the
Covid-19 pandemic have had deep global repercussions, the unfamiliar environment during
Covid-19 stands out as an additional hurdle for active managers.
7.2 Impact of active management across Scandinavia
Although the Scandinavian countries share similarities, our findings suggest dissimilarities
worth highlighting at the country level. This section covers the differences observed in
the cross-country and within-country analyses. What can we learn from the performance
differences across and within the relatively homogeneous Scandinavian market?
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7.2.1 Fund performance across Scandinavia in crises
When separating the crises, the performance of Norwegian active funds should be
highlighted. Norwegian funds performed better in the Oil Crisis than in non-crisis
(however not significant results). Similar outperformance was not observed for Danish
and Swedish funds.
We suspect that this difference can be due to the informational advantage Norwegian
active managers have from operating in an oil producing country like Norway. This
suggests that staying close to markets, sectors and companies can offer an informational
advantage in crisis, and hence allow active managers to quickly respond and adjust their
strategies in response to oil price fluctuations.
Norwegian funds performed worse than its Scandinavian peers during the Covid-19
pandemic. This suggests that staying close to a sector, such as oil, can also come with
challenges. The oil price drop that occurred alongside the pandemic did not boost the
Norwegian economy. The oil price collapse was accompanied by other strong structural
trends, and the significant increase in preference for low carbon energy investments might
have created a tougher environment amplifying the underperformance of Norwegian active
funds.
In sum, active managers across Scandinavia tend to deliver similar negative results in crises.
At the same time, we find evidence that sector exposure comes with both advantages
and disadvantages. We continue this discussion in relation to active managers investment
focus.
7.2.2 Fund performance dependent on domestic investment focus
The effect of domestic investment focus offers some interesting fund performance results
both across countries and crises.
For all three countries, we find evidence that funds with domestic investment focus
performed better in the Financial Crisis. A study suggests that active managers liquidate
their investments in remote locations first in times influenced by market volatility
(Giannetti & Laeven, 2016). This suggests that the benefit of investing locally disappears
the further away from home the investment. Scandinavian active managers investing
46 7.3 Implications for investors
"close to home" rather than "far away" in the Financial Crisis might benefit since the
main damage of the crisis also occurred outside of the Scandinavian region.
Our results indicate that Norwegian funds invested domestically performed better during
the Oil Crisis than in non-crisis. We find evidence that managers investing "close to
home" have an informational advantage, which is aligned with the findings of Coval and
Moskowitz (2001). Active managers who manage to foresee how the oil price develop can
potentially dampen and at best avoid underperformance. Norway’s oil dependence and
possible information advantage both in the industry and respective companies might have
contributed to Norwegian active managers’ unique position and ability to outperform in
the Oil Crisis.
Our findings suggest that managers investing "close to home" can increase the chance
of exploiting market inefficiencies and keeping up with the fast-paced transitions in the
market.
7.3 Implications for investors
Revisiting our findings from chapter 6, we find that independent of crises high fee funds
and high active share do not offer competitive advantages relative to lower levels. However,
in crisis, higher fee funds outperform lower fee funds.
7.3.1 Fund performance dependent on the level of fees
The outperformance of high fee funds in crisis relative to low fee funds can potentially
justify the high fees. The result supports the purpose of the "insurance premium",
namely the additional cost investors pay to hedge against market volatility. The positive
interaction effect suggests that higher fee funds offer a hedge in crisis compared to in
non-crisis. This ultimately confirms that active managers do more than collecting fees.
However, the fee discussion brings up the consideration of investors’ expectations. A
recently published article on the Norwegian active fund market highlights that active
managers collect excessively high fees for an active management service that does not
deliver. Customers investing in active funds contribute extensive amounts in additional
revenue to the banking and asset management firms (Linderud et al., 2020).
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In sum, the worth of an active manager is difficult to quantify. We believe that there
are contradicting expectations between the manager and investor about what the high
fee seeks to deliver. Hence, we highlight the investor perspective as it does not seem to
harmonize with what the manager actually delivers. It is important that investors are
aware that the additional cost of active funds is primarily an "insurance" to hedge against
deep losses in crisis, and not a promise to outperform.
7.3.2 Fund performance dependent on the level of active share
Although a positive level of active management is a necessary condition for outperformance,
we find that higher levels of active management do not necessarily equal outperformance
in crisis.
Even though the investor pays a premium to get access to actively managed funds, our
results suggest that it is not worth paying more for a fund with higher active share than
a fund with lower active share in crisis. We contend that managers of funds with high
active share try too hard to outperform the index during crisis, ultimately outweighing
the benefits with costs. Hence, we find that higher levels of active management do not
make it easier to navigate in turbulent markets, but rather the opposite.
Many active managers use high fees to hide the true level of active management, as
investors easily assume that more costly funds represent better quality. This occurrence
of so-called closet indexing is disclosed more frequently in the news. The prevalence of
these funds is concerning as few tools exists to help investors distinguish costly active
funds with managers who fail to deliver the promised active share. This discussion is for
another time, but it is highly relevant in light of our results suggesting that higher fees
and lower active share are better performance indicators in crisis.
7.3.3 Persistence amongst top performing funds
The analysis on persistence of top performing funds show that persistence exist, however
not as apparent in the Financial Crisis. This indicates a potential for manager skills in our
fund sample. Again, the evidence of persistence can have implications for investors when
making investment decisions. However, this analysis is primarily meant as an inspiration
for further research on the topic. More on this in chapter 9 on further research.
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7.4 Implications for the future of active management
The underperformance we observe in the active fund market suggests that the ongoing
shift from active to passive will not reverse anytime soon. As other studies suggest,
investors vote with their best and most precious capital to “safer” index funds during crisis
(Darbyshire, 2020). Does this indicate that active managers have failed to prove themselves
for too long? If this trend is continuing, studies find that it can have bad consequences.
Apparently, the shift away from active management can disturb the financial stability in
the Scandinavian market due to inefficient allocation of resources among others (Nimmo,
2020). And why is this a bad thing? Index funds primarily invest in larger, stable and
capital-intensive companies that do not necessarily contribute to disruptive technology
and innovation. This is concerning at a time were sustainability, energy transition and
innovation are more important than ever, especially when viewed in hindsight of a year
impacted by deep market crisis. However, increased focus on indexing may lead to
opportunities for active managers arising from trends linked to sustainability, energy
transition, disruptive technology and innovation. The following question remains: Should
investors stay hopeful until the next crisis proves differently? If you are worried about




In this thesis we have explored mutual fund performance in crisis in an effort to figure
out whether Scandinavian active managers live up to their pitch to outperform in crisis
relative to non-crisis. The findings suggests that active managers do not deliver. We
therefore have to reject our main hypothesis “Actively managed funds outperform in crisis
relative to non-crisis”. The key take away is that Scandinavian active funds do not offer a
meaningful hedge in crisis.
Although our main hypothesis is rejected, the additional research questions raise intriguing
insights. In fact, active fund performance differs across the Scandinavian countries.
Differences are dependent on the exposure to the market where the crises unfold. This result
suggests that even though markets share similarities in size, transparency and efficiency,
additional factors such as resource reliance and proximity to investment opportunities
play a role in times of crisis.
We have also observed important features that potentially affect active managers ability
to produce alpha such as the funds’ investment focus, fees, active share, and persistence.
Funds with Norwegian investment focus outperformed during the Oil Crisis. This finding
suggests that the informational advantage of investing locally can come into fruition and
lead to better performance in crisis.
Higher fees have no relation to better fund performance in non-crisis. However, this finding
flips in times of crisis, and the active manager collecting the higher fees perform better.
This implies that higher fees can give access to a "hedge" or an "insurance premium".
However, it is key that investors understand the mechanism of an "insurance premium"
as a hedge as opposed to a promise to deliver positive returns net of fees. The test of
persistence reveal outperformance of top performing funds over time. This can further
indicate the potential existence of skilled managers.
Our findings also suggest that higher levels of active management are not advantageous in
crisis, in fact the opposite is true. Funds with higher levels of active share display worse
performance compared to those with lower levels both in crisis and in non-crisis. In other
words, it is not worth paying more to gain access to portfolios that substantially deviate
from the benchmark in crisis. The findings suggest that managers of high active share
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funds strive too hard to capture alpha so that the costs outweigh the benefits.
To conclude, our findings add to the existing pile of literature on active fund
underperformance. Besides some promising results under the performance criteria of
investment focus, fees, active share, and persistence, the general conclusion is that active
managers struggle to live up their pitch.
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9 Limitations and Further Research
There are various opportunities to extend the research based on our findings. Below we
present suggestions for further research particularly related to the underlying market,
fund characteristics, manager skills, investor expectations, and the modern fund market.
The research questions we consider throughout this thesis can be considered in different
markets and crises. Our study is based on a market considered efficient in a global
context. Future research can consider less efficient markets in crisis in order to observe
whether active managers outperform. The market competition can also be investigated to
better understand how it impacts active fund performance. As highlighted in a Dagens
Næringsliv article, industry experts have divergent views on the existence of competition
in the Norwegian fund market (Linderud et al., 2020). In our study we did not make an
effort to identify sector exposure in crisis. However, this can be assessed in future research
to evaluate the sector winners in times of crisis.
Regardless of sector exposure, it can be of interest to identify what characterizes winning
funds. What types of funds outperform in crisis? Large or small sized funds, younger
or more mature funds? Moreover, we do not consider the underlying factors such as
trading and investment style. For instance, trading frequency and holding duration can
be additional issues that can serve as inspiration for further research. Additionally, we
mainly focus on how active share is associated with fund performance in crisis, and do
not distinguish between the four types of active management. Future studies can combine
both active share and tracking error to explore how the combination of these measures
determine fund performance in a crisis context.
Our simple model on persistence can be used as inspiration to further assess the drivers of
persistence in the Scandinavian market. The indication of fund persistence brings us to the
topic of manager skills. Previous studies suggest that highly selective and patient active
managers outperformed in periods of high cross section dispersion in return (Von Reibnitz
2017; Cremers, 2017). What strategies do managers apply to outperform? Kacperzcyk,
Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) provides insight and inspiration that can be
applied to the Scandinavian market to help determine if the winning managers engage in
regime-switching strategies to outperform.
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Although existing research mentions investor expectation it can be further highlighted
due to the divergent expectations of what the active manager actually delivers and what
the investor pays for the service. Future research can evaluate why this gap exists in the
first place and offer solutions to close it.
Financial industry experts state that asset management firms desperately need innovation
to survive in the market. Particularly three themes are highlighted as necessary in order
to remain competitive in the asset management field: cost cutting, technology to keep
up with the fast pace and changing landscape, and retention of the right people who can
constantly reinvent the business (Finnerty, 2019). Further research can assess the future
fund market to assess how funds can outperform in the future.
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A1 Linking Regression Tables and Equations
Table A1.1: Description of variables from equations
This table shows the connection of variables. Variables as presented in regression tables in chapter 6,







domestic Ddomestici δ2(eq.5.5), δ4(eq.5.6)
high fee Dhighfeei δ2(eq.5.7)
mid active Dmidactivei δ2(eq.5.8)
high active Dhighactivei δ3(eq.5.8)
domestic:crisis Dcrisist ·Ddomestici γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4
high fee:crisis Dcrisist ·D
highfee
i γmidactive
mid active:crisis Dcrisist ·Dmidactivei γhighactive
high active:crisis Dcrisist ·D
highactive
i γfee
A2 Extended Regression Tables
Below the extended regression tables are presented. Note that the extended tables for
each country regarding investment focus (Table 6.3) is not included, due to similar and
consistent results with those presented in chapter 6.
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Table A2.1: Fund performance in crises - Extended
Gross Alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
crisis -0.212∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.067) (0.050)
financial -0.164∗∗ -0.151∗ -0.735∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.081) (0.150) (0.084)
oil -0.099∗∗ -0.098∗∗ 0.005 -0.089∗∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.062) (0.045)
covid -1.408∗∗∗ -1.416∗∗∗ -1.417∗∗∗ -1.377∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.263) (0.265) (0.265)
log(fund age) 0.012 0.014 0.028∗ 0.030∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
log(fund tna) 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.004 -0.033∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017)
fund fee -0.051∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.011 -0.058 -0.066
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.046) (0.046)
net flow 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
active share -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
constant -0.025∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.003 0.054 0.082
(0.009) (0.009) (0.053) (0.054) (0.081) (0.083)
Observations 79,045 79,045 76,543 76,543 36,362 36,362 76,543 76,543
R2 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.017 0.019
Significance levels ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A2.2: Fund performance for Swedish funds in crises - Extended
Gross Alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
crisis -0.182∗∗ -0.175∗∗ -0.505∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗
(0.075) (0.075) (0.126) (0.077)
financial -0.183∗ -0.170 -1.381∗∗∗ -0.211∗
(0.108) (0.109) (0.196) (0.117)
oil -0.134∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.009 -0.125∗
(0.065) (0.064) (0.115) (0.064)
covid -0.530 -0.511 -0.500 -0.473
(0.398) (0.398) (0.389) (0.393)
log(fund age) 0.006 0.006 0.019 0.018 -0.087∗∗ -0.084∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.029) (0.038) (0.037)
log(fund tna) 0.020∗ 0.020∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.011 0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) (0.032)
fund fee -0.041 -0.042 0.009 0.007 -0.052 -0.053
(0.027) (0.027) (0.038) (0.038) (0.099) (0.099)
net flow 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
active share 0.00001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
constant 0.029∗ 0.029∗ -0.040 -0.039 -0.301∗∗ -0.217
(0.016) (0.016) (0.087) (0.087) (0.152) (0.153)
Observations 28,933 28,933 28,922 28,922 10,639 10,639 28,922 28,922
R2 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.018 0.024 0.024
Significance levels ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A2.3: Fund performance for Norwegian funds in crises - Extended
Gross Alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
crisis -0.561∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗ -0.669∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.131) (0.139) (0.132)
financial -0.579∗∗∗ -0.629∗∗∗ -0.685∗∗∗ -0.745∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.202) (0.240) (0.208)
oil 0.044 0.083 0.064 0.098
(0.148) (0.153) (0.158) (0.150)
covid -5.580∗∗∗ -5.597∗∗∗ -5.577∗∗∗ -5.655∗∗∗
(0.574) (0.576) (0.581) (0.587)
log(fund age) 0.073∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ -0.015 0.069
(0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.052) (0.057)
log(fund tna) -0.022∗ -0.023∗ -0.020 -0.024 -0.152∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.036) (0.039)
fund fee -0.050 -0.065∗ -0.006 -0.029 -0.053 -0.093
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.073) (0.082)
net flow 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
active share -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
constant -0.0003 -0.0003 0.020 0.035 0.332∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.112) (0.114) (0.145) (0.151)
Observations 17,912 17,912 17,566 17,566 12,952 12,952 17,566 17,566
R2 0.004 0.028 0.005 0.031 0.010 0.045 0.019 0.045
Significance levels ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A2.4: Fund performance for Danish funds in crises - Extended
Gross Alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
crisis -0.053 -0.038 0.051 -0.056
(0.066) (0.067) (0.075) (0.067)
financial 0.064 0.146 0.607∗ 0.087
(0.124) (0.135) (0.357) (0.137)
oil -0.143∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.0005 -0.153∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.048)
covid -0.043 -0.040 -0.015 0.050
(0.346) (0.349) (0.359) (0.353)
log(fund age) -0.020 -0.019 -0.026 -0.025 -0.115∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026)
log(fund tna) -0.004 -0.002 -0.014 -0.012 -0.007 0.0004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020)
fund fee -0.047 -0.046 -0.018 -0.021 -0.022 -0.016
(0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.065) (0.065)
net flow -0.002∗ -0.002∗ 0.0002 0.0002 -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
active share -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
constant -0.087∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 0.067 0.053 0.195∗ 0.185∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.078) (0.079) (0.103) (0.102)
Observations 32,200 32,200 30,055 30,055 12,771 12,771 30,055 30,055
R2 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.012
Significance levels ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A2.5: Fund performance dependent on the level of fees - Extended
Gross Alpha
(1) (2) (3)
crisis -0.290∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
high fee -0.076∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.037)
high fee:crisis 0.159∗ 0.160∗ 0.164∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
log(fund age) 0.011 -0.092∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.020)
log(fund tna) 0.008 -0.033∗∗
(0.007) (0.016)




Observations 76,543 76,543 76,543
R2 0.001 0.002 0.017
Significance levels ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A2.6: Fund performance dependent on the level of active share - Extended
Gross Alpha
(1) (2) (3)
crisis -0.186∗ -0.160∗ -0.160∗
(0.096) (0.095) (0.097)
mid active -0.072∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.023) (0.023) (0.039)
high active -0.099∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.027) (0.028) (0.058)
mid active:crisis -0.122 -0.145 -0.174
(0.161) (0.162) (0.164)
high active:crisis -0.347∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.146) (0.148)
log(fund age) 0.028∗ -0.083∗
(0.016) (0.043)
log(fund tna) 0.008 -0.031
(0.009) (0.025)
fund fee -0.004 -0.050
(0.023) (0.059)




Observations 37,034 36,362 36,362
R2 0.004 0.005 0.033
Significance levels ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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A3 Choice of Model
Our regression models are based on panel data. Panel data, or longitudinal data, consists
of time-series for each cross-sectional member of the data set. In our case, we observe
the same funds across time. Including multiple observations of the same units allow us
to control for unobserved characteristics for each individual fund. Two of the benefits of
using panel data includes its ability to capture greater complexity and uncover dynamic
relationships. Yet, panel data also introduces some challenges. (Wooldridge, 2013)
There are particularly two assumptions that need close attention in panel data:
homoskedasticity and serial correlation. The OLS assumptions exist to ensure that the
estimators are unbiased and efficient, and that we can draw valid and robust inferences
from our model. If not, it will be difficult to draw inference from our results, for instance
due to underestimated error terms (Wooldridge, 2013). Below we test for the assumptions
and apply correction when necessary.
Homoscedasticity
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the unobservable error uit, conditional on
control variables, is not constant. Namely, there is covariance between unobserved effects
in the error term and coefficients. With panel data the assumption must hold true for the
whole composite error term vit = ai + uit. If not, we observe heterogeneity caused from
time-constant variables ai.
Working with panel data, the variation within each error term will likely vary, hence
not homoscedastic (Wooldridge, 2013). For our sample, effects such as manager skill
and sector focus could make the sample heteroscedastic. If this is not corrected for, we
might have correlation within the fund across time. We test for heterogeneity using
Breusch-Pagan test and observe p-values below 0.05, indicating that heteroscedasticity is
present.
No serial correlation
Serial correlation occurs when the error term in one period is correlated with the error
term in another period (Wooldridge, 2013). The error terms can be correlated with
each other across funds, as the same funds are observed over time in our sample. This
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violates the assumption of no correlation between the error terms as well as no correlation
between the control variables. In our panel data, time-varying controls, such as fund
age, TNA and net flow can correlate over time. If serial correlation exists, the standard
errors are underestimated. We test for serial correlation using a Breusch-Godfrey and a
Durbin-Watson test. With p-values above 0.05 the test indicates no problem of serial
correlation. This might be due to time-dependent dummy controls.






To account for the challenges of panel data, we follow a general approach to obtain fully
robust standard errors by clustering at the fund level. Each fund is defined as a cluster
of observations over time, whereby serial correlation and heteroscedasticity are allowed
within each fund-cluster (Wooldridge, 2013). Standard errors are clustered at the fund
level in line with the theory of Newey-West (1987). It is expected that clustered standard
errors will be larger than those that are not clustered, as they better reflect the sampling
error in the pooled OLS coefficients (Wooldridge, 2013).
Fixed effects
To minimize endogeneity problems, we also control for fixed effects. By checking for fund
fixed effects at the fund level, we control for variations in gross alpha due to cross-sectional
differences on fund characteristics (i.e., manager skills or sector exposure). The fixed
effects model removes unobserved effects and any variable that is constant over time (i.e.,
manager skills) will be demeaned away. We control for fixed effects to compare the results
from what the OLS regressions with controls show. If the results are significantly different,
it indicates that the control variables are correlated with the fixed effects. Considering
our control variables, some of them might be correlated with the unobserved effects. For
that reason, we include regressions with fund fixed effects to control for omitted variables
bias in our regression models (Pástor, Stambaugh & Taylor, 2015).30
30There are other panel data estimators such as the random effects model (RE). The RE model
assumes that the unobserved effects are random, an assumption that often fails (Wooldridge, 2013). To
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A4 Remaining OLS Assumptions
Here we present the remaining assumptions for our regression estimates to ensure
unbiasedness and efficiency. We chose to stress the assumption of serial correlation and
homoskedasticity as these are common econometric pitfalls associated with panel data.
The remaining OLS assumptions are presented below.
Linear in parameters
It is important to be aware of the relationship between the independent variables and the
dependent variable. When plotting the model residuals of control variables against gross
alpha, two variables show no-linear relationships. The control variables fund age and fund
TNA are log-transformed to improve their linear relationship to the dependent variable,
gross alpha.
Random sampling
The data is collected from a reliable source (Lipper database) and we there for assume
the sample to be representative. However, we cannot be complete sure that selection bias
is not introduced after filtering the dataset and removing missing values that were not
applicable to our analysis.
Zero conditional mean
The zero conditional mean assumption implies that the error term v has an expected value
of zero given any value of the control variables (Woolridge, 2013). When this assumption
is violated, the control variable is said to be endogenous and could ultimately bias the
results. By including dummy variables (i.e., crisis periods and domestic geographical
focus dummies) that might affect our dependent variable (gross alpha) and are correlated
to our control variables, we account for possible endogeneity problems. We also control
for fund fixed effects.
test whether the RE model is more efficient for our data we conduct a Hausman test. The low p-value
allows us to reject the null hypothesis of the RE model, suggesting that the FE model is the most efficient
model to control our estimates.
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No perfect collinearity
No perfect collinearity assumes that there is no association between two independent
(control) variables (Woolridge, 2013). Multicollinearity can occur if more than two control
variables are associated, which can decrease the observed statistical significance. We
test for multicollinearity in two ways: correlation matrix and variance inflation factor
(VIF). The results show no presence of multicollinearity. Table A4.1 illustrate the Pearson
correlation coefficient for the dependent variable (gross alpha), the control variables, and
the crisis dummy variable representing the crisis periods. Table A4.2 shows the results
from the VIF-test. None of the tests suggest violation of no perfect collinearity.
Table A4.1: Pearson Correlation Matrix
gross alpha fund age fund tna net flow financial oil covid
gross alpha 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05
fund age 0.01 1.00 0.24 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.03
fund tna 0.01 0.24 1.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.01
net flow 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 1.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02
financial -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 1.00 -0.04 -0.01
oil -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.02
covid -0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 1.00
Table A4.2: VIF-test for Multicollinearity






log(fund age) 1.09 1.11
log(fund tna) 1.16 1.18
fund fee 1.12 1.13
net flow 1.04 1.05
Normality
Normality states that errors are independent of the control variables and are normally
distributed (Wooldridge, 2013). However, normality is not a required OLS-assumption.
Considering the central limit theorem, we assume approximate normal distribution with a
sample of 883 funds, and respectively 79,045 observations. We can therefor assume our
estimators to satisfy asymptotic normality.
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A5 Measures of Active Management
There are primarily two measures of active management: active share and tracking error. A
prior study based on the Norwegian equity market finds strong correlation between active
share and tracking error (Smørgrav & Næss, 2011). The first measures the percentage
of the portfolio that differs from the benchmark index. The latter measures the added
volatility in the portfolio returns due to the active portfolio strategy (Pestajisto, 2013).
In our analysis, we use active share to measure the level of active management.
